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INTRODUCTION
It is often argued that corporations are too focused on the short term
(i.e., they are “short-termist”). For example, during the 2016 U.S.
presidential campaign, candidate Hillary Clinton urged companies to
escape the tyranny of short-termism.1 Similarly, in the recent policy debate
in the United Kingdom on the need to reform corporate governance and
executive compensation, Bank of England’s Chief Economist Andy
Haldane stated that “[e]xecutive pay is a matter of profound and legitimate
public interest. Pay practices can encourage short-term behaviour in ways
which harm both firms and the economy.”2
In this context, a recent article by Flammer and Bansal (FB)
published in the Strategic Management Journal argues that long-term
executive compensation can help mitigate short-termism.3 More precisely,
FB show that the (quasi-random) adoption of long-term executive
compensation leads to an increase in firm value, an increase in long-term
profits, and is conducive to long-term investments such as investments in
innovation and stakeholder relationships. In this Article, I briefly review
the core arguments and main results of FB.
I.

A “TIME-BASED” AGENCY CONFLICT

In the economics literature, the relationship between shareholders
and managers is often conceptualized as a principal–agent relationship,
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where the principal (the shareholders) hires the agent (the management)
such that the agent will act in the principal’s best interest. However, if the
agent’s preferences are misaligned with those of the principal, the agent
can take actions that are not in the principal’s best interest—that is, in the
context of corporations, managers can take actions that hurt shareholders
and reduce the value of the firm. Such agency conflicts come in many
flavors. For example, in Jensen’s model, managers have preferences for
“empire building”—i.e., managers derive utility from being in charge of a
large empire—and hence tend to engage in value-destroying acquisitions.4
Other traditional agency conflicts include, for example, managers’
preferences for shirking5 or managers’ tendencies to engage in too little
risk-taking.6 In all these models, managers act in a way that is not in the
shareholders’ best interests, which in turn decreases the value of the firm.
FB propose a new form of agency conflict, which they coin a “‘timebased’ agency conflict.”7 This “time-based” agency conflict arises if
managers’ time preferences are misaligned with those of the shareholders.
FB argue that managers are likely to be more myopic compared to
shareholders. In particular, career concerns, short-term compensation, and
pressure to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts are all considerations that
may induce managers to invest in (inferior) short-term projects at the
expense of (superior) long-term projects, thus hurting the value of the
firm.8
To the extent that FB’s “time-based” agency conflict has bearing in
the data, one would expect the provision of long-term incentives—such as
the use of long-term executive compensation—to alleviate managers’
tendencies to overinvest in short-term projects and ultimately increase
firm value.
II.

THE CAUSAL IMPACT OF LONG-TERM EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION

There are three main tools of long-term compensation: 1) restricted
stocks (i.e., stocks that cannot be sold in the short run), 2) restricted stock
4. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986).
5. See Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979).
6. See Bengt Holmström, Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective, 66 REV.
ECON. STUDIES 169 (1999).
7. See Flammer & Bansal, supra note 3, at 1827.
8. See François Degeorge et al., Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds, 72 J. BUS. 1
(1999); Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career
Concerns: Theory and Evidence, 100 J. POL. ECON. 468 (1992); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats
and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61 (1988).

2018]

Long-Term Executive Compensation

421

options (i.e., stock options that cannot be sold or exercised in the short
run), and 3) the so-called long-term incentive plans (LTIP). In practice,
LTIPs are implemented in a variety of ways, but typically feature the
award of stocks or options contingent on the achievement of some preestablished, long-term targets.
To examine whether the provision of long-term compensation is
value-enhancing, one approach would be to regress firm value (e.g.,
Tobin’s Q) on long-term compensation (e.g., the ratio of long-term to total
compensation).9 However, as FB emphasize, such a regression might be
misleading given the potential endogeneity of long-term compensation
with respect to firm value.10 In other words, unobservable characteristics
may drive a spurious relationship between the two. For example, it could
be that companies with better long-term prospects are both (1) more
valuable and (2) more inclined to reward their management through longterm compensation. In this case, one would observe a positive correlation
between firm value and long-term compensation, yet it would not be
indicative of a causal impact of long-term compensation on firm value.
Admittedly, it is difficult to establish causality. In the ideal
experiment, one would randomly assign long-term compensation to some
companies and short-term compensation to others—similar to the
approach used in randomized controlled trials. One would then compare
the differential in firm value between the two groups. Naturally, such an
experiment is difficult to conduct in the real world. Instead, FB use an
empirical setup that is very close in spirit to this ideal experiment.11
Specifically, they focus on shareholder proposals advocating the use of
long-term executive compensation that pass or fail by a small margin of
votes. Intuitively, whether a proposal passes with 50.1% of the votes or is
rejected with 49.9% of the votes is as good as random. Hence, such “close
call” proposals provide (quasi-)randomized variation in the use of longterm executive compensation.
FB consider all shareholder proposals on long-term executive
compensation that came to a vote between 1997 and 2012 and are
compiled in the SharkRepellent and RiskMetrics databases.12 There are
808 such shareholder proposals, out of which sixty-five have a vote
outcome within ±5% of the majority threshold, and 152 have a vote
outcome within ±10% of the majority threshold; intuitively, these
9. “Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of total assets (computed as the book value of total
assets plus the market value of equity minus the sum of the book value of equity plus deferred taxes
and investment tax credit) to the book value of total assets.” Flammer & Bansal, supra note 3, at 1835.
10. See id. at 1828.
11. See id. at 1835–37.
12. See id. at 1833.
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proposals can be seen as being “close calls.” FB then use a regression
discontinuity design to estimate how the adoption of close call proposals
affects several outcome variables.13
FB’s main result is that the stock market reacts positively to the
adoption of close call, long-term compensation proposals.14 Specifically,
FB find that a proposal that is marginally accepted yields an abnormal
return of 1.14% compared to a proposal that is marginally rejected;
intuitively, shareholder value increases by 1.14%. This finding suggests
that long-term compensation is value-enhancing and hence supports FB’s
“time-based” agency conflict: by adopting long-term executive
compensation—and hence by switching towards a longer-term
orientation—companies can alleviate the misalignment of time
preferences between managers and shareholders, which ultimately
translates into value creation.
FB also explore the impact of long-term executive compensation on
operating performance.15 They examine three measures of operating
performance: the return on assets, net profit margin, and sales growth.
They find that all three measures increase significantly in the long run (i.e.,
as of two years after the vote). Interestingly, they find that operating
performance decreases slightly in the short run, suggesting that the
adoption of a longer-term orientation might require some sacrifices in the
short run (e.g., by investing in ambitious research and development (R&D)
projects that are costly in the short run). Nevertheless, the net effect is
positive since value increases overall.
FB further study the mechanism through which the adoption of longterm executive compensation benefits shareholders. They find that longterm compensation is conducive to long-term investments such as
investments in innovation and stakeholder relationships.16 First, FB
document a significant increase in R&D expenditures and the number of
patents following the adoption of close call, long-term compensation
proposals. What is more, FB observe an increase in the number of highlycited patents—i.e., not only the quantity of innovation increases but also
the quality of innovation. Also, FB document an increase in the number of
explorative patents (i.e., patents in fields that are “new to the firm”),
suggesting that companies pursue riskier (and arguably more ambitious)
innovation. Second, FB observe that companies significantly increase their
stakeholder engagement following the adoption of close call, long-term
compensation proposals, as measured by the Kinder, Lyndenberg, and
13. See id. at 1835–37.
14. See id. at 1838–40.
15. See id. at 1840.
16. See id. at 1840–42.
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Domini (KLD) index of social performance from the KLD database.
Among the different types of stakeholders, they find that the increase is
especially pronounced with respect to employees and the environment.
The result pertaining to employees is in line with previous studies showing
that employee satisfaction is a significant driver of value creation.17
FB’s findings that companies increase their long-term investments
following the adoption of close call, long-term compensation proposals
yield further support for the presence of a “time-based” agency conflict.
To the extent that myopic managers (i.e., managers whose time horizons
are too short-sighted compared to shareholders’ time horizons) tend to
underinvest in valuable long-term projects, one would indeed expect a
shift towards more long-term investments (such as innovation and
stakeholder relationships) once managers are incentivized to adopt a
longer-term horizon through the award of long-term compensation.
CONCLUSION
FB’s results indicate that long-term compensation is effective in
mitigating managerial myopia. Their results have been highlighted in the
recent policy debate in the United Kingdom on the need to reform
executive pay.18 In his blog post featuring FB’s study, Alex Edmans
highlights where FB’s study fits in the current policy debate:
Executive compensation is fixed and needs reform. But, most of
the calls for reform focus on the wrong dimensions. They focus
on the level of pay . . . [whereas] the most important dimension is
the horizon of pay—whether it depends on the short-term or longterm.
We certainly want executives to act in the interest of society,
and for a more equal society. But, the way to increase equality is
not to bring CEOs down, but to induce them to bring others up.
Treating stakeholders (workers, customers, suppliers, the
environment) well is costly in the short-term, but the evidence
shows that it pays off in the long-term. So the best way to
17. See, e.g., Alex Edmans, Does the Stock Market Fully Value Intangibles? Employee
Satisfaction and Equity Prices, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 621 (2011); Alex Edmans, The Link Between Job
Satisfaction and Firm Value, with Implications for Corporate Social Responsibility, 26 ACAD. MGMT.
PERSP. 1 (2012); Caroline Flammer, Does Corporate Social Responsibility Lead to Superior Financial
Performance? A Regression Discontinuity Approach, 61 MGMT. SCI. 2549 (2015).
18. See Alex Edmans, BUS., ENERGY & INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY COMM., SUBMISSION TO
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INQUIRY, 2016-17, HC CGV006 (UK), http://alexedmans.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/Corporate-Governance-Inquiry-Short.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SQY-RG53].
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encourage purposeful behavior is not to scrap equity incentives
(thus decoupling pay from performance), but extend the horizon
to the long-term.19
While FB’s results provide a first step in understanding the benefits
of long-term compensation and how it helps mitigate managerial myopia,
further research is needed to fully understand the usefulness of this tool.
In particular, more work is needed to understand the conditions under
which long-term executive compensation is most effective and how it can
be best integrated with other governance mechanisms (e.g., the linking of
executive compensation to social and environmental performance
criteria―a novel governance practice documented by Flammer, Hong, and
Minor).20 Making ground on these questions is an exciting avenue for
future research.

19. Alex Edmans, Long-Term Executive Incentives Improve Innovation and Corporate
Responsibility, ALEXEDMANS.COM: ACCESS TO FIN. (Sept. 17, 2016), http://alexedmans.com/longterm-executive-incentives-improve-innovation-and-corporate-responsibility/ [https://perma.cc/9C5Z7MZA].
20. See Caroline Flammer et al., Corporate Governance and the Rise of Integrating Corporate
Social Responsibility Criteria in Executive Compensation: Effectiveness and Implications for Firm
Outcomes (Sept. 11, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2831694 [https://perma.cc/9R97-6L2W].

